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the different interests of rich and poor countries can be addressed – but policymakers
must also face new realities. Scientific evidence shows that the climate policies formu-
lated so far are unfit to deal with the magnitude of the challenge.
This book looks realistically at the options for a deal to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. It
sets out some of the main ingredients that will have to be included for finalisation of an
economically rational agreement that stands a real chance of addressing the threat to the
climate system. It critically analyses the European Union's climate policies before re-
viewing the key elements of such an agreement: carbon markets, flexible mechanisms
for transferring money and technology to developing countries, innovation, and the ef-
fective enforcement of a global climate deal.
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hy do reasonable people disagree when they should agree? Why is it so
difficult to reach international agreement on the management of a global
public good such as the climate?
Scholars of policy discussions have shown that disagreements often arise from
cognitive differences (over a phenomenon’s true model), from distributional
conflicts, and from time-preference heterogeneity. Global warming ranks high on all
three dimensions. This explains the extreme difficulty of the international policy
discussion.
Trade provides a useful benchmark for assessment. Trade negotiations look
hopelessly intricate to outsiders but are conceptually remarkably simple. To start
with, they are underpinned by a well-established theory that makes it plain that
trade improves the welfare of participating countries. Second, trade opening is a
positive-sum game benefiting all participating countries. There are losers within
countries, but most of the time they can be compensated through national rather
than international policies. Third, the intertemporal trade-offs involved in trade
matters are uncomplicated: within each country, the short-term pain is offset within
a few years by permanent gain.  
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Let us now use the same criteria for assessing the climate agenda. There is no real
remaining controversy about the reality of climate change, but the evidence about
the impact of climate policies is still marred by significant uncertainty. In particular,
no one knows if innovation will in future dramatically reduce the cost of emissions
abatement, and this significantly affects the policy trade-offs. Second, emissions
control involves significant distributional effects among countries, most notably
between ‘North’ and ‘South’: some major developing countries argue (rightly) that
they have not contributed significantly to greenhouse gas stocks, and they claim
(questionably) that they should therefore be exempt from constraints on emissions
for an extended period. This complicates agreement a great deal. Third,
intertemporal trade-offs are horribly complex as climate change policies essentially
consist of trading off our welfare against that of our offspring in five decades or
more. Even economists – not to speak of policymakers – are still debating how to
weigh future gains against present losses, as illustrated by the controversy over the
discount factor used in the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. 
Two factors add extra complexity. With the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the world has been equipped for more than half a century with a set of
principles for trade policies and trade negotiations, to which all countries have
adhered. In comparison, the Kyoto Protocol was an important first step, but it is an
ad-hoc agreement whose structure is debatable, not least because it does not
impose any obligations on developing countries. Also, climate policies entail huge
changes for the economy – they have an impact on competitiveness, affect
innovation, modify the growth path and, last but not least, imply major changes in
consumption patterns and lifestyles.
All this leads to seeing Copenhagen as a step in what will necessarily be a
protracted and imperfect process. It is to be hoped that it will result in a broad
agreement and will pave the way for further decisions, but it will certainly not end
discussions on controversial matters. And whatever shape the Copenhagen
agreement takes, implementation will be crucial. As shown by the Kyoto Protocol, a
lack of enforcement mechanisms can seriously jeopardise an agreement.BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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Against this background, the role of experts and think tanks is to help clarify the
issues and put the debate on the right track. This was Bruegel's aim when Juan
Delgado organised two workshops under the auspices of the French Presidency of
the European Union during the second half of 2008. We have asked some of the
participants in the workshops to provide their views on different ingredients for a
global climate agreement in order to provide a guide for policymakers. These
contributions summarise the authors’ extensive research on the topics. 
The volume therefore does not aim to give a unified point of view but to explore
different ways to approach a global post-2012 climate agreement. 
Financial aid from the French Ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du
Développement durable et de la Mer is gratefully acknowledged both for the
organisation of the workshop and for the publication of this volume.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director of Bruegel
Brussels, September 2009T
he Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December 2009 is fast
approaching. The conference will set the basis for a global climate agreement that
will replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. But the foundations of such an
agreement are still shaky. Pressure on negotiators is high, and there has been some
progress. The cost of disagreement would be substantial. The outcome will be
crucial for the future of humanity.
The main elements of this putative deal were codified at the end of 2007 in the Bali
Action Plan
2, to which all participants in the post-Kyoto talks subscribe: the need for
a long-term climate goal, the need to focus on mitigation, but also on adaptation,
steps to promote development (such as actions to combat deforestation and build
resilience) and encourage technology transfer, providing finance for clean techno-
logy and mechanisms for comparing efforts and achievements under a future deal.
The June 2009 discussions in Bonn showed that domestic realities play an
important role in determining each country's approach towards climate policies,
and that the determination of each nation's contribution to funding of the future
global deal is still a major obstacle to the final agreement. Climate is far from being
perceived as a global public good.
1
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A tourist guide to Copenhagen:
open issues for a global climate agreement
1Kyoto has shown us what works and what does not work but a future agreement
has to go beyond Kyoto in two senses. First, it should develop those instruments
that have worked under Kyoto. Second, it should incorporate new aspects in order to
attract those countries that were absent from Kyoto. This implies that the new
agreement will surely be more sophisticated than Kyoto. Targets alone will not be
enough, agreements will have to include policy roadmaps. Current technologies will
not do the job, new technologies will be needed and innovation policy will play an
important role both for mitigation and for adaptation. Finally, a satisfactory
agreement should be equitable in terms of funding and burden-sharing in order to
attract developing countries, and should be non-distortionary in terms of trade so
that it is acceptable to developed economies.
What Kyoto taught us
To a great extent, the experience of the Kyoto Protocol overshadows discussions on
the shape of a post-2012 international climate agreement. It is useful therefore to
understand the key features of the Kyoto Protocol. Its central provisions are an
equity dimension – that the burden of responding to climate change will be shared
according to wealth and historic responsibility for global warming – a focus on
committing to achieve results rather than on making specified efforts, and an
emphasis on mitigation rather than on adaptation. The Kyoto Protocol led to the
establishment of market-based approaches to climate change, specifically cap-
and-trade systems (and in particular the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS)), and
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM – see the glossary for an explanation of
terminology).
Kyoto has focused on targets and not on policies. Under Kyoto, countries have had
discretion to choose their climate policies according to their priorities. Kyoto has
also been 'fair' in that the emphasis is on industrialised countries to mitigate
emissions – in other words, those countries with the greatest capacity to take
action, and also those countries that are historically responsible for greenhouse
gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. Kyoto also survived a very difficult political
BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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or regional climate policies.
However, Kyoto has weaknesses. It has not led the world's biggest emitters, China
and the United States, to reduce their emissions. In the Chinese case, this is
because – like other large emitters Russia and India – China is not subject to an
emissions reduction target. The US, meanwhile, did not ratify the Protocol,
underlining the lack of any enforcement mechanism for signatories that walk away.
Countries may also walk away from the Protocol ex post by not meeting their
emission reduction targets. Canada, for example, has already announced it will not
stick to its Kyoto commitment.
The non-observance or non-ratification of Kyoto by some of the main emitters has
been the cause of the existence of carbon leakage, the process by which industries
subject to costs related to climate mitigation simply relocate to less-regulated parts
of the world. Concern about this was a major reason for US non-ratification of the
Protocol, and is one of the main concerns in the current debate about a new climate
agreement. Although Kyoto introduced flexibility mechanisms such as the CDM in
order to reduce the cost of climate policies, increase efficiency and help developing
countries to develop their own climate policies, the effectiveness of such
mechanisms has been questionable. Finally, Kyoto contained weak compliance
mechanisms and was focused on mitigation and not on adaptation.
The Copenhagen challenge is to create a post-Kyoto agreement that will correct the
weaknesses and put in place a scientifically sound, economically rational and
politically pragmatic global climate policy architecture (Joseph Aldy and Robert
Stavins outline two of the possible architectures in their contribution to this book).
Developments in understanding of the global warming problem should help to push
this. There is greater concern about climate and environment, among both the
general public and the business community, than there was at the time Kyoto was
signed. There have also been great strides in reporting on emissions and
verification of emissions reporting. Climate science has moved on and the
BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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negotiations will be much better informed than the Kyoto negotiations. Whereas
Kyoto led to substantial free-riding, the economic incentives for responding to
climate change are now stronger and better understood.
Targets, harmonised policies, or both?
Discussions on a post-2012 framework are revisiting questions that arose when
Kyoto was negotiated: is it better to adopt a target-led approach, with countries
responsible for keeping their emissions below certain caps, or would harmonised
policies be more effective? The European Commission has said that emerging
economies should commit to reducing the carbon intensity of their development,
and should put in place a 'map of policies' that will lead to emissions being up to 30
percent lower than business as usual. Such an approach may make it possible to
move away from negotiations focused largely on numbers and towards
negotiations including credible policy paths that make those targets implementable
and realistic. The commitment to policies rather than targets would make
commitments more credible and compliance monitoring more effective.
This issue arose in the Kyoto negotiations, but harmonised policies were resisted
by the US in particular as part of a resistance to any approach that might lead to
what could be perceived as a United Nations carbon tax. Instead, under Kyoto,
industrialised countries were allocated greenhouse gas emission reduction targets
relative to historic base years (1990 in most cases).
The post-Kyoto deal does not need to be an either/or choice between targets and a
'map of policies'. It could include both. However, a significant weakness to be
addressed is governance. The experience of the EU emissions trading system has
shown that strong domestic institutions and implementation are necessary to
make such a scheme work. Not every policy is implementable in every country. One
size does not fit all countries. The range of available policies should be flexible
enough to respond to the institutional features and the economic development of
BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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agreement include energy efficiency policies, and policies to target the most
significant sources of emissions. However, resistance to international oversight of
domestic policies will have to be addressed.
Beyond the question of targets, there are three central issues that a post-2012
global agreement should tackle:
• Climate and development: the impact of climate policies on growth, and
especially on development, is one of the main obstacles to implementation. A fair
burden-sharing rule and cost-efficient measures are essential for the
acceptability of climate policies.
• The link between climate policies, trade and competitiveness: how climate
policies interact with trade policies and how to tackle carbon leakage.
• The role of technology for global warming mitigation and adaptation: technology
is essential to meet any emissions target. The shape of innovation policies, their
funding and their interaction with other policies will be essential for the
effectiveness of emission-abatement policies.
Developing countries: us and them
Climate negotiations show a clear divide between developed and developing
countries: us and them. The historical responsibility for the stock of carbon dioxide,
the fact that emissions in developing countries are partially caused by products
exported to developed economies and the likely impact of climate policies on
development are at the centre of the discussion between developed and developing
economies.
The largest emerging economies, China and India, both have climate policies,
emphasising energy efficiency, reductions in the carbon intensity of development,
reforestation, better pollution control, and renewable energy. Both refuse to
countenance binding targets on their emissions, as these are seen as caps on
BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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poor by the standards of the industrialised world. A 'cap-or-else' approach in
negotiations would not succeed in bringing developing countries on board. China
and India also both emphasise international cooperation and transfer of funds and
technology as crucial to their decision to sign up or not to a post-Kyoto regime.
A common criticism of EU policies is that they are directed to controlling emission
flows but not stocks, although stocks have been mostly caused by developed
economies. This responsibility for past emissions should in some way be reflected
in future policies.
Emissions in developing countries are partially generated by production of products
that are exported and consumed in developed countries. Some claim that a fair deal
would imply taxing consumption rather than production (see Dieter Helm's
contribution to this volume). In the absence of a consumption-based approach to
the taxing of carbon, compensation mechanisms might be necessary to make sure
that the allocation of the burden between consumers and producers is to some
extent ‘fair’. It is however also true that taxing the emissions integrated in
consumption might not be effective enough in creating incentives for ‘dirty’
producers to use less carbon-intensive production technologies.
The impact of climate policies on development is also a common fear for developing
countries. To make the development path less carbon intensive, it is important that
targets and funding are to certain extent decoupled (ie that targets allocated to
developing countries do not necessarily have to be funded by developing countries)
and that international cooperation is enhanced to facilitate the flow of both funding
and new technologies. As highlighted by Axel Michaelowa and other contributors to
this volume, it is important both for Europe as well as for developing countries that
the project-based market mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol – the
CDM and the Joint Implementation (JI) projects – still operate. For Europe, this is
because these mechanisms could help to curtail emissions at a lower cost, while for
developing countries they constitute an important source of finance and
BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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awards of carbon credits should be carefully revised in order to make sure they are
effective in reducing GHG emissions.
A new global agreement should expand the range of instruments for fighting climate
change, including other ways of reducing carbon emissions, such as reforestation.
Reforestation projects are a very important tool to reduce emissions in some
developing countries (eg Brazil, Indonesia). At the moment, such projects do not
qualify for the Kyoto flexible mechanisms though this is likely to change. Expanding
the range of available instruments will increase efficiency and reduce costs.
Making development and climate policies compatible is one of the challenges of a
new global agreement.
Climate, trade and competitiveness
The absence of climate policies in some countries, or their incompleteness, creates
trade distortions between countries. This could be a significant obstacle to a global
climate agreement.
Concerns about carbon leakage must be addressed to avoid the negative
consequences of offshoring emissions – a potential dislocation of production, with
no overall effect on carbon levels. Future policies must be acceptable for continued
economic activity while addressing the environmental downsides of production and
trade. This implies a coordinated approach internationally, and a move towards
similar standards and commitments within international trade rules. However,
experience shows that defining these rules is a long and tortuous process.
Trade policy can act as a facilitator of technology transfer, but risks of protectionist
backlashes must be minimised. Trade can reduce poverty and mitigate climate
change for example through the promotion of clean growth by removal of barriers to
trade in renewable energy technologies, clean coal, energy-efficient devices and
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would be preferable to trade restrictions.
The threat of 'green tariffs' to protect domestic products from competing products
coming from countries with less stringent climate policies is a recurring one. The
asymmetric implementation of climate policies places firms (especially in carbon-
intensive industries such as cement, steel or aluminium) located in countries
applying a price to carbon at a competitive disadvantage, and might provide them
with incentives to relocate to countries with weaker environmental regulation.
Even if all countries implemented climate policies, competitive trade distortions are
likely to remain since it is unlikely that the coverage of such policies will be the
same in all countries, given their diverse emission profiles, potential for abatement
of emissions, and institutional frameworks. Commitments and policies are likely to
differ for each country. A common set of commitments and policy architectures for
all developing countries might therefore not be feasible. The asymmetric impact of
climate policies will remain. In view of such asymmetries, industries will still be able
to use regulation strategically when choosing the location of their production.
Cross-country competitive distortions will continue to exist even if a ‘satisfactory’
agreement is reached. Carbon leakage problems will be solved by the convergence
of climate policies and this is a long-term process. Focussing the current discussion
on carbon leakage might be an obstacle to the future convergence of climate
policies.
The likely outcome of a global agreement will be heterogeneous policies in different
countries covering different sectors with different obligations. This could set the
basis for the creation of a global carbon market but, given the likely strong
asymmetries in national policies, it would be far from being comprehensive, at least
in its initial stages. As suggested by Denny Ellerman in his contribution to this
volume, a global carbon market will be more likely to emerge from the linking of
different national initiatives, rather than from a policy objective from the outset to
establish a global carbon market.
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of the present system is lack of compliance mechanisms. Use of trade instruments
within a system of trade agreements and retaliatory measures could offer a way of
ensuring compliance with post-2012 climate rules – a means of identifying who is
playing the game and who is not, with a formal regime of judgements and sanctions.
Should trade instruments be used, there are arguments for and against their
unilateral application, as has been suggested in the EU with the idea of border
measures for carbon-intensive goods as a way to assuage the competitiveness
fears of EU industry subject to participation in emissions trading. On one hand, even
if such a border tax was consistent with World Trade Organisation rules, it could lead
to retaliatory measures, and thus an undermining of economic efficiency. On the
other hand, there is an argument for the EU using the power of its market to require
certain standards from importers, as in the case of the REACH chemicals
legislation
3. Standards might be equally effective and politically more acceptable
than tariffs.
Trade instruments might be an effective means for tackling non-compliance, but
they could also be a source of conflict if used as a tool for correcting the inevitable
initial asymmetries derived from the different starting points and economic and
institutional characteristics of different countries.
Technology and innovation: a two-way approach
As emphasised by Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni (see chapter
5), innovation is a vital factor in the climate and energy debate, covering energy
efficiency, mitigation (for example carbon sequestration), and energy sources (for
example renewables and nuclear). The promotion and circulation of new
technologies is therefore an essential ingredient of an effective global agreement.
Innovation can create substitutes for resources and help with adaptation to climate
change. Sustainable development should encompass innovation. Growth in
productivity, and decoupling of growth from capital accumulation and carbon
intensity, will be dependent on innovation. Current technologies are not sufficient to
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and central role in fighting climate change.
Carbon markets and price signals might not be sufficient to correct the CO2
externality since they might not provide sufficient incentives to reach the optimal
level of innovation in the long term. Carbon markets might be short-sighted, and
they do not cover all sources of carbon emissions. Innovation allows emissions
abatement costs to be reduced and also improves measurement tools, allowing
more targeted and precise policies. A combination of carbon-pricing policies and
innovation policies is necessary to reduce carbon emissions effectively. The EU is
following a dual path of a carbon price and innovation support, with the ETS and the
strategic energy technologies action plan (SET-Plan)
4, though funding sources for
innovation support are not always clearly delineated.
Spillovers from innovation
Spillovers from innovation not only occur within industries, but also between
developed and developing countries. Accelerating innovation in developed
countries helps to increase the competitiveness of green technologies and
facilitates the adoption of such technologies by developing countries, even if
developing countries do not have active climate policies in place. Stimulating
innovation in developed countries gives developing countries an incentive to adopt
the technology and jump forward in terms of their development paths
5. More work
has to be done to assess these factors, with the impact of innovation possibly
playing a greater part in post-Stern evaluations of the economic costs of climate
change
6. Assessments of the impact of technology on the damage side needs also
be carried out.
Major cuts in GHG emissions must be achieved in emerging economies and poorer
countries. It is therefore essential that new climate-friendly technologies reach
developing countries. The CDM in its current form, which allows firms to buy carbon
credits in developing countries, helps to transfer new technologies from rich
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sufficient to make the most of new technologies. Further analysis of instruments to
facilitate the transfer of technologies to developing countries should be pursued.
Which technologies?
Carbon markets or taxes are technology-neutral, but other measures to encourage
innovation can favour certain technologies, such as feed-in tariffs for renewables in
Germany, which are strongly biased toward solar generation. Choices about which
technologies to support must be made; choices also have to be made about what
support schemes should look like, notwithstanding the risk that governments want
to pick 'technological winners' and provide support to certain technologies in order
to promote domestic industry using climate policy as an excuse to undertake
industrial policy. Policies pursued on this basis could result in inefficient
investment and increase the costs of tackling climate change. Support for new
technologies should be directed towards the gaps not filled by investments
triggered by carbon markets.
What should drive the level of support is not the cost difference compared to
conventional technologies, but the magnitude of the externalities associated with
each technology. For example, a technology that has high potential to contribute to
reducing carbon emissions at a low cost and development of which relies on
extensive experimentation and widespread market availability is a good candidate
for relatively large support. On the contrary, technologies that reach maturity
rapidly and depend mostly on firm-specific research might not be good candidates
for extra support. Support beyond the magnitude of the relevant externalities might
lead to an inefficient growth path.
Short-term targets might also create the wrong incentives to under-invest in
technologies that will have an important role in the longer term. Care should be
taken in deciding the targets and their time horizon as well as the link between
short- and long-term targets.
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Reducing greenhouse emissions should be the main focus of climate policies. All
climate-policy instruments should be designed to deliver the objective at the
minimum cost. In that sense, innovation policy is no more than a complementary
policy tool to other instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as cap-
and-trade schemes or carbon taxes. The interaction between such instruments
should be carefully fine-tuned in order to achieve the optimal combination. The cost
efficiency of innovation policies should be measured in terms of how much it costs
to reduce a ton of carbon through supporting new technologies in comparison with
other instruments. This exercise will not be trivial since the impact of innovation
policy is not immediate, while investment has to start today.
Conclusions
The objective for international climate negotiators is a scientifically sound,
economically rational and politically pragmatic global climate agreement to
succeed the Kyoto Protocol. But the tools and the political will are in the hands of
national governments. National policy instruments might not be the straightest
path towards a global objective, but they are probably the only tools available. A
bottom-up approach to climate policies seems most pragmatic and effective, but it
needs to be enriched. A Kyoto-type agreement has proved to be too minimalistic for
the level of ambition needed in the post-Kyoto period. The new global climate
agreement should be more wide-ranging in order to enhance cooperation,
guarantee compliance and ensure its effectiveness.
Breaking down the barriers between developing and developed countries requires
clarification over funding and acceleration of the transfer of technology. Trade and
competitiveness concerns will disappear if climate policies converge. However,
convergence should not be imposed from the beginning but should evolve as a
consequence of a comprehensive agreement based on a combination of flexible
tailor-made instruments and targets.
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that could go into a global climate deal. Contributors do not aim to provide a single
view but a diversity of approaches to a global climate consensus.
Dieter Helm starts by analysing critically EU climate policies, highlighting those
elements that could be an obstacle to the integration of EU policies into a global
agreement. Denny Ellerman advocates an agreement that would frame the
appropriate conditions for local (even partial) carbon markets that may, in the
future, set the basis for a global carbon market by linking the different mechanisms
in place in different territories. Facilitating the acceptance of a global agreement by
developing countries is essential to making the agreement effective in terms of
mitigating global warming. Axel Michaelowa analyses how flexible mechanisms
should be reformed in order for them to be an effective instrument for the
development of climate policies in developing countries, for the transfer of
technology from developed to developing countries, and for the abatement of
emissions at the lowest cost. Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni
analyse the role that technology and innovation could play in reducing global
emissions. They put forward a dual approach where both price and quantity policy
instruments and technology policy have a role in a future global agreement. Finally,
Joseph Aldy and Robert Stavins suggest two possible policy architectures that, in
combination with other policy instruments, could be the basis for the
implementation of a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically
pragmatic post-2012 agreement for addressing climate change.
Innovation, technology transfer, flexible mechanisms, effective policies and targets,
financial cooperation, free trade and carbon markets: the ingredients are on the




he European Union’s climate package was signed off by the Council of Ministers
in December 2008 (European Parliament, 2008). It is very ambitious, and it is
firmly set within the context of the process of agreeing an international climate deal
at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009, as a follow-on from the first Kyoto
period.
The package is full of detail, but its overall architecture is remarkably simple. The EU
commits to reducing emissions by 20 percent from the 1990 level by 2020, and 30
percent if the United States and others take similar measures
7. This will be achieved
through three main policy instruments: the EU emissions trading system (ETS), a
20 percent target for renewables as a proportion of total energy by 2020, and a 20
percent target for energy efficiency.
These ambitions are underpinned by a series of bold claims about the (low) costs,
the contribution to jobs and growth, and the building of new infant industries, which
will give Europe a comparative advantage in world markets.
The neat packaging of all these components around the number ‘20’ is political, not
economic, and it is extremely unlikely that all these dimensions of climate change
policy will happen to coincide with 2020, or 20 percent for the targets. This short
2
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EU climate policy and Copenhagen:
does it make much difference?paper explains why the EU package is not quite what it seems, starting with the
overarching 20 percent target (section 2), before turning to the roles of two of the
main instruments: the EU ETS and the renewables target (sections 3 and 4
respectively). The package is notable not just for the chosen instruments, but also
for what is left out (section 5). The missing parts turn out to be at least as important
as the parts included, and these form the basis for considering what Europe could
positively do at Copenhagen to make a significant difference to climate change,
which the existing package will not (section 6).
2. The 20 percent target: production, not consumption
The 20 percent target sounds like a big number, especially when set aside the US’s
modest legislative plans, which if implemented would reduce emissions by 2020 to
a level around four percent below that of 1990. A 30 percent target sounds even
bigger. But before any conclusions are drawn, it is important to look at the basis for
the number. The 20 percent refers to production, not consumption of carbon, and it
is not confined to the EU only, but includes emission reductions in third countries
through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits
8.
Production of carbon within the EU depends upon the industrial mix. The production
measure has not so far included shipping and aviation – and going forward will only
imperfectly include them – and it also excludes imports of carbon-intensive goods.
Thus it is possible that, within the EU, production may be low-carbon, with high-
carbon production located overseas, and the carbon-intensive goods then imported
into the EU. For example, large-scale energy-intensive industries such as steel and
shipbuilding may migrate to China, China may use coal-generated electricity in
manufacturing (with lower efficiencies and pollution controls than in Europe) and
then export the finished product (by ship) to Europe.
It is even possible that carbon production might fall steeply inside Europe while at
the same time carbon consumption rises sharply. That is precisely what has been
happening in one of the countries that claims to be meeting its Kyoto target – the
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than 15 percent, while carbon consumption rose by more than 19 percent over the
same period (Helm, Smale and Phillips, 2007). This inversion will vary between
European countries, but the trend towards outsourcing carbon-intensive industries
to countries such as China and India is a general one.
It is carbon consumption that matters in calculating contributions to atmospheric
concentrations. What the Kyoto Protocol does is to set the targets in a way that
suits the Europeans (and the US too), and it is therefore not surprising that Europe
signed up to Kyoto so readily, further encouraged by the collapse of the eastern
European economies and Russia after 1989. That the Copenhagen position has
been defined in these production terms is therefore politically unsurprising.
However, it remains sadly true that Kyoto has probably achieved very little so far,
and that when account is taken of carbon outsourcing, the achievement of the 20
percent production target will have, at best, modest effects on the carbon
concentrations in the atmosphere.
But it is worse: the production-based approach couches China as the villain in the
Copenhagen negotiations. The Europeans’ position is that since the EU is taking on
the 20 percent production target, China should take on a production target too
9.
From China’s perspective, the reply can be that it is in part emitting carbon on behalf
of the EU and the US. It remains the case that China is also producing carbon from
manufacturing for its own internal consumption, but it is the export side of the
economy which has been growing fast.
3. The EU emissions trading system
Central to the efficient achievement of any carbon target – whether production or
consumption – is a long-term carbon price. This internalises the externality, without
requiring a prior view to be taken about the relative merits of demand versus supply-
side responses, or of the technologies. The price also allows the market to adjust
the time profile of carbon reductions.
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arguably inferior to a carbon tax
10, though in practice the differences are ones of
degree rather than kind, once the quantities within the EU ETS are adjusted over
time. In practice, however, the EU ETS departs considerably from an efficient design.
The main faults are: it is short-, not long-term; the quantities are open to
manipulation; and the price that results is likely to be (well) below either the social
marginal cost or the marginal cost of meeting the target (where the target is non-
optimal).
The time dimension matters greatly. The EU ETS is currently in phase 2 through to
2012, and the framework for 2012-20 is far from concrete. Although the caps are
set out to 2020, there is considerable scope built in for ex-post adjustment,
especially if the EU ETS is to be broadened over the period to bring in others, notably
the US. Unsurprisingly then, the price revealed is very short-term. Yet the capital
stock is largely given for this short term – indeed, through to 2020. What matters is
how that capital stock is replaced, particularly in the energy sectors. Investment
appraisals need to take account of the expected post-2020 price.
It is argued that the EU ETS is designed to endure and it is reasonable to expect that
the price of permits will follow a long-term upward slope. But why? It is possible that
other countries do not join in a new carbon framework; that other instruments, such
as renewables quotas, will drive low-carbon technologies through regulation or a
carbon tax; or even that the whole framework is re-cast in consumption terms as
recommended above. And it is possible that decarbonisation might actually
happen, in which case the expected carbon price after 2020 might be much lower.
Given the low estimates of the total costs of decarbonisation provided by the Stern
Review
11and others, that is indeed what might be expected.
The price in early 2009 is an example of a rapid reversal of expectations: in
December 2009, the Commission was confident that the price would be much
higher for all the 2008-12 period. Just a few months later it fell sharply, and now
there is considerable confidence that it will remain low. This ex-ante price
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error that has been made is to assume that oil prices are on an ever-upward path –
but, as witnessed after the peaks of 1979 and 2008, the opposite can happen.
Fortunately this problem can be solved without junking the EU ETS. In order to create
a long-term price of carbon, a floor price needs to be set, coupled with an agreement
never to lower it. Although, in theory, this could be a floor price within the EU ETS
12,
the political economy militates against this, for it would require governments to buy
up permits at the floor price, and government budgets are unlikely to permit this.
The alternative is to have a floor price outside the EU ETS – in effect, a floor carbon
tax. This could be set at a low level initially, rising over time. Two variants are
possible: the price of carbon is the sum of the floor price plus the EU ETS price; or the
floor price is net of the EU ETS, and applies only when the price of EU ETS permits
falls to the floor
13.
4. The renewables target
In principle, a carbon price could achieve all the targets. However, the EU climate
change package goes in for some over-determination by also fixing a renewables
target of 20 percent of total energy by 2020 to be supplied from renewable sources.
The explanation for this target is largely political and is tied up with the evolution of
green (and anti-nuclear) politics in the EU.
It is not obvious that this is an efficient way of tackling global climate change
because, given that it is a short-term target (to 2020), it concentrates investment
on those technologies that are quickly deployable. Of these, wind plays a core part,
and for some countries like the UK, it commits to a very rapid expansion – in the UK,
from around five percent to perhaps 35 percent of electricity generation by 2020.
The consequences are ill thought-out. Wind is intermittent and requires
predominantly fossil-fuel back-up. This means gas, unless the security-of-supply
consequences of a major EU-wide dash-for-gas are so great that more coal capacity
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14. This coal may be ‘carbon capture-ready’, but most of the carbon will not be
captured for a decade. A dash-for-wind could therefore increase the coal burn. Even
where gas is the back-up, the possibility that Russia may not have invested enough
to honour its European contracts and meet its own demand means that it may itself
increase its coal burn to free up gas for Europe. So, once the carbon consequences
have been fully taken into account, the net effect on emissions of the dash-for-wind
may be (very) small.
Renewables are also expensive relative to alternative ways of reducing carbon
emissions – indeed, this is why they are not left to the market in the context of a
carbon price as other technologies (such as nuclear) are. These costs could have
been directed elsewhere, to other measures which are left out of the climate change
package.
5. What is left out: R&D, CCS, nuclear and the post-2020 framework
If the problem is global climate change, an important starting point in designing
climate change policy is to identify which emission sources are likely to dominate
in the coming period. Even a cursory inspection of the evidence suggests that the
expanding share of coal in world energy supply is the main concern, and that this
increasing coal burn is located largely in China and India
15.
The question then to ask is: how do the EU climate package measures address coal
and China? It is hard to argue that expensive wind farms in the North Sea make
much difference. To put it another way, there are numerous other ways of spending
these large sums which make a much greater contribution to reducing emissions.
First and foremost is carbon capture and storage (CCS): if carbon cannot be
captured and stored and if the coal-burn continues to rise, all other measures will be
rendered largely redundant in the attempt to limit global warming. Europe
fortunately has a large number of depleted gas fields – notably in the shallow North
Sea, and often with pipes connected to them. A major EU CCS initiative on an urgent




efforts. To its credit, the EU is now supporting a number of demonstration plants
16,
but the the total national and European support for wind is on an altogether bigger
scale.
A second option is nuclear. It can be deployed on a large scale over a reasonable
time period. Until very recently, however, many environmentalists believed nuclear
power to be anathema. Given the pivotal role that green votes have played in
determining coalitions across Europe, this anti-nuclear position has had a major
policy impact. It is now dawning on many environmentalists that, without nuclear,
climate change probably cannot be halted. Yet the EU climate package is almost
silent on this contribution.
CCS and nuclear are themselves unlikely to be enough. New technologies will be
needed and there is very considerable research and development under way. In the
EU package, this has a marginal role.
6. A better way forward
In the run-up to Copenhagen, and given the political capital invested in the EU
climate package, the EU is likely to stick to the package and continue to use it as its
baseline for negotiations. No doubt some sort of agreement will materialise, but it is
unlikely to do much about climate change. Indeed, the less effective the outcome,
the easier it will be to agree. In terms of impact, this is likely to be small, in the face
of an emissions trend that is not only upwards, but accelerating.
The outcome is unlikely to make much difference because of the way it is couched
and the high costs associated with the current policy instruments. A global
agreement requires the full participation of China and India – already one-third of
the world’s population and by 2050 probably over 40 percent. This requires a
sharing of responsibility for consumption, not production. Europe must pay for the
carbon in its imports and for its share of shipping and aviation. But that requires EU
politicians to explain to their electorates that the costs of mitigating global climatechange are going to be much higher than they have so far indicated. Recent
evidence suggests that boosting short-term consumption is a much higher priority.
The next step is to encourage a global long-term price of carbon. In principle, this
could be achieved by marrying up various cap-and-trade schemes, including the EU
ETS. But this will take (much) time, and little is likely to be practically achieved for
a decade. The pace of emissions growth dictates a faster time, and therefore the
introduction of floor carbon taxes is a matter of urgency – starting with the EU.
Relying on the EU ETS as the principal mechanism to establish a carbon price will
inevitably result in lower prices than necessary, and the emergence of an
international ETS price will take longer than the problem demands.
In terms of direct technology support, it is not at all clear that this should go so
predominantly to wind. It would be better to concentrate on the core problem of the
next two decades – coal and therefore CCS. But whilst these are short- to medium-
term issues, the overwhelming challenge is to develop new technologies. An
international collaboration on R&D would probably make more difference than all
the other policies added together.
It is late in the day for the EU to change tack, and probably too late for Copenhagen.
But Copenhagen is just one conference in what will be a long series of repeated
negotiations. It would be better to go back to the drawing board than to push for an
agreement without a solution at Copenhagen. Locking in a production approach, the




A global carbon market: from Kyoto to
Copenhagen via the EU ETS
T
he Kyoto Protocol created the prospect of a global carbon market to facilitate an
efficient policy response to concerns about climate change, but the road from
Kyoto has taken many unexpected turns. At the same time, the European Union’s
emissions trading scheme (ETS) – a system inspired by the Kyoto Protocol but also
independent of it
17– has shown the way to a global carbon market. If the road from
Copenhagen is to avoid the detours and dead-ends of the Kyoto Protocol, the path
blazed by the EU ETS will need to be followed.
The world carbon market has grown exponentially in the last few years, from a little
over 100 million tons in 2004 to three billion tons in 2007 (Figure 3.1). This market
consists of three distinct sub-markets – a voluntary one, the Kyoto market (trading
in credits from CDM and JI projects), and the EU ETS – but there should be little
doubt that the spectacular growth of the global carbon market is due to the EU ETS,
especially when its influence on the Kyoto credit market is taken into account.
The distinguishing feature of these three sub-markets is the source of demand and
the motivation for that demand. Private entities are the source of demand in the
voluntary market, very much as is the case in more familiar markets. It is appealing
to imagine that this market will grow as increasing numbers of people become
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convinced of the benefits of buying an iPod. Unfortunately, the benefits from
purchasing a verified emissions reduction (VER) credit, the currency in this sub-
market, are not evident beyond whatever personal satisfaction the purchaser can
muster for doing the right thing. The quality of VERs has also been uneven, but the
fundamental problem inhibiting growth in this sub-market is the insubstantiality of
the benefits and the evident free-rider problem. This characteristic makes the
demand for VERs especially fickle and the prospects for growth particularly
dubious.
Figure 3.1: Global carbon market, annual trading volume, 2004-2007
Source: World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2008 and preceding editions.
The principal buyers in the Kyoto market are the governments that have fallen short
of the emission targets agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol and who take those
commitments seriously. Three fully substitutable products are traded on this
market:
AAUs: The tradable Assigned Amount Units that each Annex I government signatory
(generally industrialised economies) to the Kyoto Protocol received as an
allowance target for its emissions over the 2008-12 period;CERs: The Certified Emission Reduction credits for project-based emission
reductions achieved in non-Annex I countries (generally developing economies);
and
ERUs: The Emission Reduction Unit credits for project-based emission reductions
achieved in Annex I countries (which also involve a transfer of AAUs). 
The Kyoto market can also be characterised as voluntary, although the buyers are
different from those in the true voluntary market and, it is to be hoped, not so fickle.
Still, purchases depend on the willingness of the governments of sovereign nations
to honour their Kyoto Protocal commitments, and perhaps additional commitments
to be made in subsequent international agreements. The prospects for continuing
commitments appear good for European governments, but the same cannot be said
for several other signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. Japan is an important participant
in the current market, but it is also the unhappiest camper in Camp Kyoto. Canada
has officially stated that it will not meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
and how the prospective non-compliance of this usually exemplary world-citizen
nation will be handled is a subject that few wish to discuss openly. Russia’s
ratification (in exchange for EU support of Russia’s World Trade Organisation
membership) allowed the Kyoto Protocol finally to enter into force, but Russia’s
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol did not require it to do anything and no one
expects much from Russia in future climate negotiations. The United States and
Australia appear to be willing to make commitments as the result of elections, but
these changes only emphasise the problems with the Kyoto (or any alternative
government-based) market.
A hybrid market
The EU ETS is a hybrid: the sources of demand are private but participation is not
voluntary. It is forced on private agents by a government requirement to surrender
European Union Allowances (EUAs), the currency of this market, equal to
emissions. Some target allocation of EUAs has been issued to installations subject
to the surrender requirement – all large stationary sources in the EU – and the
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smaller scale the buyers in the Kyoto market.
This market is also linked to the Kyoto market in two ways. Since all but two of the
member states of the EU have emission limitation requirements
18 under the Kyoto
Protocol, each EUA is linked to an AAU. In tying AAUs to EUAs, EU member states have
effectively passed about 40 percent of their Kyoto obligation onto private entities
and let them work out how best to make the required emission reductions. In
addition, the private entities subject to the EU ETS requirements can purchase CERs
or ERUs (but not AAUs) and submit them for a portion of their surrender
requirement. Thus, the Kyoto and EU ETS sub-markets of the present global carbon
market are linked. The fewer the EUAs (and associated AAUs) issued to the private
entities in the EU ETS, the more AAUs remain with the issuing governments to cover
non-ETS emissions and the less the demand by those governments in the Kyoto
market. And, of course, the fewer the number of EUAs issued, the more the private
entities subject to the EU ETS must abate or purchase more CERs and ERUs to cover
emissions.
This link between the EU ETS and the Kyoto market explains how the EU ETS became
the driving force in the global carbon market. Since the EUA price has been higher
than expected prices in the Kyoto market, a worldwide impetus has been given to
project developments that create CERs and ERUs that can be sold into the EU ETS
market. Although an undetermined share of the CERs and ERUs created to date will
be bought by governments, most of the nearly one billion tonne growth in this
market has been motivated by EU ETS buyers.
This combination of government fiat and private actors is the secret to the success
of the EU ETS in creating a global carbon market. While governments can be fickle as
regards international agreements, policies implemented domestically tend to stick.
Thus, the future prospects for the continuation of this market are far brighter than
for the other two sub-sectors of the global carbon market. As evidence, one needs
only to recall the amendments to the ETS Directive finalised in December 2008
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beyond, independently of what happens at Copenhagen or subsequent
international gatherings.
The EU ETS is important not just in accounting for the virtual entirety of the growth
in the global carbon market to date, but also and more importantly for
demonstrating the feasibility of a multinational system and for reminding all
players of how real demand is created, and thereby real markets. The creation of this
multinational system involving private agents from 27 sovereign nations is little
short of astonishing. Although all the participating nations belong to the EU, the
latter is capable of effective action only when there is consensus between the
members. All member states participate in the EU ETS despite large differences in
per capita income among member states (a factor of five) and very different
historical circumstances and experience with markets. Finally, in the recent
amendments to the ETS Directive, these nations agreed again, unanimously, to
continue the programme, to tighten the EU-wide cap significantly, and to
differentiate the burden placed on different member states appropriately. This is
what a global climate regime will need to do, but it all starts with creating real
demand at home.
Patience required
The EU ETS has demonstrated that an enduring global carbon market will not be
created by over-arching international agreement, but by the actions of individual
nations, perhaps acting together as in the EU, to create real demand through the
adoption of compatible cap-and-trade programmes. This reality counsels patience
as other nations, such as the US, work through the domestic problems inevitably
involved in creating such programmes. International agreements may facilitate
domestic actions, much as the Kyoto Protocol inspired the creation of the EU ETS,
but creating real demand depends on country-specific trade-offs and decisions that
are fundamentally internal and political.
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be a source of despair. Vision, perseverance, and a readiness to turn accident to
advantage explain a lot of history. In fact, the creation of the EU ETS is surprising
given the opposition of most European nations to emissions trading in the
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. The U-turn has been due in part to the vision and
perseverance of key actors, but historical accident also played a strong role. A
budding sense of European identity, an increasing desire to stand out globally and
to lead in some manner (preferably employing 'soft power') and the unexpected US
non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol provided the basis for the political consensus
that allowed all the member states to create the real demand that would make the
whole thing work. Finally, given the commitments in the Kyoto Protocol and the
seriousness with which they came to be viewed, passing on (or, some might say,
off-loading) those commitments onto the private sector provided compensating
advantages that made this course of action relatively painless for governments.
A facilitating framework
What then remains for Copenhagen if the key decisions in the creation of a global
carbon market are not taken there? The two most important results can be
summarised as a facilitating framework and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
reform. A facilitating framework should aim at making it easier for nations to take
the measures required to create real demand and thereby to expand the global
carbon market. CDM reform is needed to establish indirect linkage between the
existing global carbon market and newly emerging but separate markets that will
arise from the inevitably bottom-up process of creating real demand.
The spirit of the facilitating framework should be educational. Aspirational targets
and timetables may be inevitable but, if so, they cannot be so demanding as to
invite open rejection, silent disregard, or never-again compliance as has been the
case with the Kyoto Protocol for the US, Canada and Japan, respectively. The
compliance of a number of western European nations either individually or through
the European burden-sharing agreement is laudable, but it must also be recognised
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US, Canada, and Japan. And, of course, the non-binding targets of other Kyoto
signatories, such as Russia, eastern European nations, and even some EU15
nations, provide no real test at all.
A more supportive framework would be one that recognises that cap-and-trade is
not an obvious approach to environmental regulation and that constructing a
market where none has existed is not a usual government activity. These are not
natural markets that have developed through ageless custom and for which
government need only provide useful policing and enforcement of contract and
property rights. Not only must difficult decisions be made concerning the
appropriate amount of scarcity and the distribution of the new property rights, but
a significant infrastructure for monitoring, reporting, verification, and allowance-
tracking must be created from scratch. What can be broadly characterised as
education can go a long way towards making the inevitably internal decisions
easier through exchanges of information and of experience in addressing these
issues. Such activity was one of the most important activities of the European
Commission in facilitating the adoption of the EU ETS. Something similar will be
needed on the global stage.
Improve the CDM
CDM reform involves not only the obvious correction of problems revealed in the first
years of operation, but also, and more importantly, completing its transformation
into an entity that certifies the integrity of project-based emission reductions in
countries and sectors that have not yet established cap-and-trade systems. Like
the EU ETS, it should be inspired by, but independent of, time-limited international
treaties.
The benefits of a viable, independent, and long-lasting CDM are three-fold. First, to
the extent that cheaper emission reductions are provided, the cost to nations
imposing limits on their own greenhouse gas emissions is reduced. The global
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naturally seek to limit costs by allowing their use. The existence of a credible source
of offsets of the requisite integrity will spare each nation adopting a cap-and-trade
programme the necessity of setting up their own certification procedures.
Second, in a bottom-up world in which nations act independently, common offsets
provide an indirect means of linking otherwise separate systems and facilitating
mutual recognition. Credits generated by these projects will naturally flow to the
market with the highest price and thereby will tend to align prices in otherwise
separate markets. Negotiation will be required to achieve the full mutual
recognition that would characterise a fully integrated global carbon market, but
those discussions will be much easier the more aligned the prices in the two
systems are. Similar prices will make both the practical consequences of mutual
recognition and nettlesome conceptual issues like 'equivalent stringency' fade
away into insignificance.
The third and final benefit of a more permanent CDM is that it will make it easier for
developing countries to ‘graduate’ into the ranks of those nations and sectors
adopting limits on greenhouse gas emissions. This too is an educational mission,
with projects providing the experience with emissions trading and its non-negligible
requirements that will prepare the way for the adoption of sector or country limits
at some future time.
In all of these functions, the CDM’s role is transitional since there will be no need for
it when all nations, or all significant ones, have adopted limits. This, however, is a
long way off and in the meantime there is a pressing need for certifiable credits,
indirect linking and learning by experience.
These goals for Copenhagen may be viewed as uninspiring and pedestrian, but
climate change policy is a field all too often characterised by soaring but failed
ambition, and one sorely in need of modest but real accomplishments, such as the
EU ETS. The EU's cap-and-trade programme has kept the hope created by Kyoto alive
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the EU ETS has blazed the way to a global carbon market, it remains a path and not
yet a highway. Persevering along it and getting others to follow will take patience
and fortitude. While this may be frustrating, it is the reality of the present and likely
future global governance structure, and demonstrates the difficulty for even well-
organised societies to solve problems of collective action.
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ften, putting in place a new policy instrument requires a lot of persuasion. Once
policymakers have understood the concept behind the instrument, it can seem
very attractive as long as it has not been applied in practice. But when the first real-
life implementation challenges have to be faced, politicians lose interest and switch
their attention to new, as yet uncompromised, instruments. Once this instrument
has lost its lustre as well, sometimes they then ruefully turn back to the first
instrument and try to make the best of it.
In international climate policy the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has
completed the first part of this cycle. It took about a decade from 1991 to convince
policymakers that the concept of project-based offsets was not some lunatic idea
but a sensible incentive that could mobilise low-cost emission reductions. After
2000, several years were spent setting up the rules to prevent 'paper credits', ie
credits not covered by real emissions reductions, with a small group of overworked
UN officials performing near miracles.
With these rules in place and the European Union’s emissions trading scheme
providing a powerful monetary incentive, the CDM took off in 2005 in a way that had
not previously been imagined. By early 2009, almost 5,000 projects were working
their way through the system and the creation of close to three billion CDM credits
4
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(Certified Emissions Reductions or CERs) was forecast by the end of 2012. 
The key challenges to the CDM
While the success of the CDM has spawned an industry of project developers and
consultants, since mid-2007 the mass media have started to draw attention to the
scheme's shortcomings. US newspapers in particular have stridently criticised the
mechanism as a failure. The increasing media attention has led to a reaction on the
part of CDM regulators, as well as to a negative attitude on the part of US
policymakers. The latter is surprising because the US had been the country pushing
most strongly for the inclusion of the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol. What challenges
does the current CDM face?
The CDM gold rush and additionality
Obviously, a gold rush like the one experienced by the CDM will expose any
weaknesses of the instrument. The CDM’s key weakness was the challenge in
defining the concept of 'additionality'. A CDM project should only be awarded
emission credits if the project would not have taken place without the incentive
provided by the CERs, making the credits 'additional' to business as usual. Of course
it is not easy to judge entrepreneurs’ minds or to assess their project investment
decisions. It is no surprise that business lobbies wanted to get CERs for any project
where emissions were below a predetermined baseline, whereas environmental
NGOs wanted to reject any profitable project. But the CDM regulators worked out a
sensible compromise. The entrepreneur defines the most profitable realistic
alternative to the CDM project and as long as the CDM project is less profitable, it is
additional. Optionally, the project developer can also show that his project faced
prohibitive barriers that were only removed by access to CDM credits. But the
problems started when this apparently sensible rule had to be applied in practice.
In the CDM system, independent auditors play a crucial role. They check ('validate')
the project documentation provided by the entrepreneur, making sure it is inconformity with the rules. If they had done their job properly, the additionality crisis
would probably never have erupted. But from the outset, the validators became
servants of the project developers and wilfully repeated their sometimes extremely
flimsy arguments. At that stage, the regulators did not have enough manpower to
check the project documentation, and therefore a non-negligible share of projects
without demonstrable additionality was registered.
The regulators did however notice that problems were building up, and so introduced
a second layer of checks through CDM experts, the so-called Registration and
Issuance Team. These checks immediately led to the review and rejection of some
projects, but it was not until the UNFCCC Secretariat had hired more staff that
another layer of checks was introduced. Moreover, the additionality test was
specified much more clearly. Currently, about 10 percent of projects are rejected
because they are not additional. However, most of these projects are relatively
small and other projects based on the same flawed argumentation continue to pass.
A reason for this inconsistent treatment by the regulators might be their lack of
immunity against legal cases brought by large companies whose projects have
been rejected.
Project developers have therefore become increasingly bold. They submit projects
that started long ago. More and more large renewable energy projects with doubtful
additionality are entering the pipeline. Chinese hydropower plants that report an
unrealistically low plant load factor and therefore manage to show low profitability
are particularly notorious. However, since late 2008, validators have become much
more careful after market leader Det Norske Veritas was suspended for non-
compliance with the rules for auditors (Det Norske Veritas was suspended in late
2008, and reinstated in February 2009).
Baseline methodology challenges
To calculate the number of CERs generated by a CDM project, a reference emissions




using a methodology specific to each emissions mitigation technology.
Methodologies – which also apply to the monitoring of emission reductions – are
proposed by the project developers and checked by an expert panel, prior to the
regulators finalising their decision on a proposal. While such a bottom-up procedure
makes sense insofar as scarce regulatory capacity does not have to be spread too
thinly, the stubbornly high rejection rate of submitted methodologies is a cause for
concern. Over half of the proposals have been rejected and the success rate has not
improved over time. This is a consequence of parallel learning by the project
developers and regulators. A methodology approved in 2005 would no longer stand
a chance of passing today. Therefore, methodology development has become an art
exercised by highly skilled and paid consultants.
Several strategies have been developed to get methodologies approved. The easiest
one is an extremely narrow definition of applicability criteria. This allows the
formulae to be kept very specific, and the number of baseline scenario alternatives
to be limited. Somewhat more complex is the submission of a simple methodology
first that is approved relatively easily, and is then revised successively to fit to the
project. For some time, it was also possible to submit a proposal for a small-scale
methodology, which was almost sure to be passed. But after this route had been
used excessively, it was aligned with the standard procedure.
But even once a developer has got a methodology approved, he cannot rest on his
laurels. This is due to the fact that the regulators can see the flaws of the
methodology once its application has started. The regulators then revise it,
frequently requiring more complex equipment or reducing the CER volume that can
be generated by a project. Some methodologies have been revised every three
months, and almost none have been retained in their original versions. A
particularly challenging activity is the 'consolidation' of methodologies, meaning
that similar methodologies are thrown together and afterwards lose their validity.
Data used for baseline methodology development have also become a headache. To
facilitate project development, some countries have published emission factors fortheir electricity grids. This has made life easier for the project developers. However,
once the methodology changes, the data are no longer consistent with it. In early
2009, a number of renewable energy and energy-efficiency projects in India were
stalled because the regulators required validation of the officially published grid
electricity baseline data. As this validation is difficult and requires in-depth
understanding of the Indian power sector, no private project developer was willing to
bear the cost of this exercise, which could easily reach €100,000.
Monitoring and issuance challenges
Once a CDM project has been registered and starts operation, it has to monitor the
emission reductions it achieves. This monitoring must be done according to the
monitoring plan described in the project documentation. Many projects now face the
challenge that their design changes between the point at which documentation is
submitted for registration and actual implementation. For example, a hydropower
plant might use a generator from a different supplier than originally envisaged, with
a different capacity. Or an energy-efficiency improvement project might use newly
introduced technology that did not exist when the documentation was written. For
any design change, the CDM rules require a revision of the monitoring plan. Due to
the regulatory overload, such revisions can easily take half a year.
Another challenge, especially for projects that started in the early phase of the CDM,
is that local staff do not understand the importance of monitoring and there are
periods where the monitoring equipment does not work. For example, in a large gas-
flaring reduction project in South East Asia, data was not collected properly for a
period of several months. The project developer asked for a (one-time) deviation
from the monitoring plan. It took more than a year before a regulatory decision was
made to accept this deviation. Currently, there is an intense discussion about the
interpretation of the principle of achieving a 95 percent confidence interval in
monitoring if there are only a limited number of data points during a certain period.




UNFCCC Secretariat. Therefore, in order to be conservative, very strict requirements
for monitoring equipment were set. For example, quarterly monitoring of the
methane content of the exhaust gas from flares burning landfill gas was required.
The necessary equipment is very expensive and not available in many CDM host
countries. It took more than a year before the regulators allowed use of a default
factor for flare efficiency, which then led to an upswing of landfill gas project
submissions.
Where technologies become more complex, monitoring standards from
industrialised countries have frequently been prescribed. However, the regulators
decided in a landmark ruling that no standard should be prescribed. How this rule is
going to be implemented remains to be seen.
Notwithstanding all these challenges, until early 2009, issuance of CERs was rarely
rejected. However, the share of reviews is creeping upwards. It is also a sign of
relevant problems that CERs have so far been issued for only a third of registered
projects.
Reform proposals on the table
As the negotiations of the post-2012 climate policy regime are currently in full
swing, there are several fora for discussing CDM reform. One centres on short-term
reform, the other discusses sweeping reforms for the time after 2012.
Short-term reform
Additionality testing can be substantially improved. Investment analysis should
become mandatory and should be made subject to checs by a local expert.
Incentives for the validators should be improved by hiring them through the UNFCCC
Secretariat. Parameters used in the investment test should be checked by a local
expert hired by the Executive Board (EB) of the CDM. Benchmarks used to
determine the attractiveness of an investment should be based on objective criteriasupported by published data. Definition of the prohibitive character of barriers can
be further clarified.
The current institutional structure of the CDM is seen by some observers as being
incapable of effective administration of the CDM. The EB has reacted to criticism
regarding the performance of validators by drafting a Validation and Verification
Manual, which became mandatory in late 2008. Moreover, the huge increase in
support staff allows the EB to delegate tasks and improve the consistency of its
decision-making. However, the introduction of an appeals mechanism for project
developers as well as a clear hierarchy for decisions has been proposed, and was
endorsed by the Conference of Parties at Poznan in 2008
19.
In mid-2007, the CDM regulators introduced a new 'programmatic' CDM approach.
This allows the bundling of many small projects over a period of 28 years, even if the
exact timing and number of projects are not known at the time the programme
starts. Unfortunately, the detailed rules for registration of a programme contain
several prohibitive elements so that, to date, not a single programme has been
registered. The Poznan conference asked the CDM regulators to remove these
obstacles as quickly as possible but they have not yet been able to do so.
Post-2012 reform
The main reform options under discussion represent an attempt to improve the
environmental integrity of the CDM. They can be differentiated into three main
strands:
• Replacing project-based additionality testing by benchmarking;
• Going beyond 1:1 offsetting as a means of generating a contribution of the CDM
to global emissions reductions;
• Introducing a sectoral crediting mechanism.




of similar projects, has had a chequered history. In general, the sectors that can
most easily be benchmarked produce goods or services identical in their nature and
in their production processes, are highly concentrated, have no geographical
factors distorting the level of performance, and already have a large amount of
available data. Benchmarking was already under discussion in the late 1990s and
retained a small foothold through a rule that allowed the baseline to be set at the
level of the 20 percent best comparable installations. However, this option featured
only in a small number of approved baseline methodologies. Nevertheless, many
observers have proposed using benchmarks for determining additionality.
Using the same benchmark for the demonstration of additionality and the level of
the baseline does not, however, seem to be an appropriate way of guaranteeing the
additionality of CDM projects. Thus a double benchmark concept has been proposed
by some. This sets separate benchmarks for additionality and the baseline, with the
additionality benchmark more stringent than the emissions benchmark. However,
the setting of the additionality benchmark level is challenging. If it is set too
stringently, no CDM projects will be implemented, while a loose benchmark will allow
too many projects to generate CERs, which would have happened anyway. Contrary
to the current situation of bottom-up methodology development by single project
developers, a higher-level institution, for example an industry association, would
develop benchmarks under the CDM. The institutions developing the benchmark
have to incur significant costs for benchmark development, while the individual
project developers would benefit due to reduced transaction costs. If data or
benchmarks collected and developed by industry initiatives are used under the
CDM, rules and monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures will have to be
established at international level. At the same time, solutions will have to be found
for dealing with confidentiality of data. Benchmarking might be as prone to gaming
as project-based baseline setting.
A top-down approach to protecting the additionality of the CDM and even to
generating net global emission reductions has recently been proposed. Emissions
reductions achieved by CDM projects would no longer be converted 1:1 into CERs,but there would be a discount factor. For example one tonne of CO2 reduction would
only generate 0.5 CERs. Discounting could be differentiated according to countries
or project types. In the former case, more advanced countries would face a higher
discount factor than less advanced ones. This would encourage the advanced
countries to take up emission reduction commitments. Differentiation according to
project type could take into account the probability that projects of a certain type
are additional, or the contribution of a project type to sustainable development.
Discounting has been boosted by the draft American Clean Energy and Security Act,
which was passed by the US House of Representatives in June 2009. This bill
initially proposed a 20 percent discount for CERs to apply from 2012. In a later
version, this was modified so that the discount would kick in only after a certain
grace period.
The EU has proposed a sectoral crediting mechanism. A host country would propose
coverage of a sector and the target level, allaying fears of being bullied into the
sectoral crediting mechanism. A new UNFCCC body or the current CDM regulators
would evaluate the proposed target and the target level would have to be confirmed
by the Conference of the Parties. The EU wants the no-lose target to be stricter than
business as usual. There is consensus that registered CDM projects in a sector
covered by the new crediting mechanism can continue to generate CERs until the
end of their current crediting period, even if this goes beyond 2012. This amount of
CERs would have to be deducted from the sectoral credits generated through the
sectoral mechanism. Given the key role of the host-country government in this
sector-wide approach, the question looms large of incentives for the individual
entities actually reducing emissions as well as the treatment of 'free riders'
increasing their emissions. Beyond a sectoral crediting mechanism, sectoral
emissions trading on the basis of a mandatory target would be possible if the target
is below business as usual.
Summary
Despite implementation problems, the CDM has been a success. It is the only bridge
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emissions-mitigation action. The success of the CDM has however also shown
starkly several shortcomings that need to be remedied to ensure that the
mechanism does not lose its near universal acceptance among policymakers. The
key challenge is the lack of additionality of a sizeable share of CDM projects. Each
non-additional project increases global emissions. Thus the international climate
negotiations are discussing reforms. Short-term reforms would improve governance
and make regulatory decisions more consistent. Long-term reforms could lead to a
shift from the current 1:1 offsetting system to a system that only credits part of the
reductions. This would improve additionality on the aggregate level and provide an




t is now widely accepted that global warming mitigation requires immediate
action in all or almost all countries if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are to be
effectively controlled. There is growing hope that the stalling of international
negotiations might end this year in Copenhagen, or in the very near future, thus
creating the conditions for a global effort to mitigate climate change. Low-hanging
fruit and no-regret options in emissions mitigation may be enough to provide an
initial common foundation for action. Nonetheless, a short-term forward-looking
policy should also focus on climate-friendly innovation as an indispensable tool for
efficiently achieving climate stabilisation.
This chapter
20analyses the role of technological innovation in the context of climate
policies aimed at long-term climate stabilisation. We argue that innovation is key to
keeping the potentially escalating costs of emissions abatement under control, and
that energy-saving and carbon-saving research and development programmes
represent a hedging strategy that should be pursued immediately. If endorsed as
stand-alone policy, climate innovation will not be enough to effectively stabilise
GHG concentrations at safe levels.
However, if coupled with market-based climate policies, such as cap-and-trade
systems or carbon taxes, innovation can deliver substantial emission reductions at
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lower costs. If it is additional to carbon pricing, innovation can indeed be shown to
improve the economic efficiency of climate policy by roughly 10-15 percent.
Introduction
The policy debate on the role and potential effectiveness of technological change for
reducing GHG emissions is topical. Not only has the literature on the subject been
re-energised in the last decade, but whether or not technology policy should lie at
the core of the climate change challenge is also hotly debated at the political level.
Despite the many uncertainties about the magnitude of the impact of technological
change on mitigation costs, there is broad agreement that technological innovation
is an important condition to foster the necessary de-carbonisation of the world's
economies. From the discussion on innovation and environmental externalities
affecting energy-related and carbon-saving R&D, one can conclude that the optimal
mix of climate policies should also include instruments explicitly designed to foster
innovation, and possibly diffusion of technology, in addition to carbon-pricing
policies, either cap-and-trade or taxes, that stimulate new technology as a side
effect of internalising the environmental externality. Likewise, long-term carbon
saving R&D alone might not be sufficient from an environmental perspective,
because it provides no direct incentive to control emissions, and because it focuses
on the longer term, missing near-term opportunities for cost-effective emissions
reductions (Philibert, 2003; Sandén and Azar, 2005; Fisher and Newell, 2004).
Innovation and technology policies have received considerable interest from
policymakers in the past few years. Proposals for international technology
innovation strategies have been put forward (Newell, 2008), encompassing both
domestic and international policies to foster R&D and the sharing of knowledge
thus generated. Some climate-related scientific and technology agreements have
also emerged in the past few years, including the Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, and the
International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy.Innovation strategies have also been analysed in the context of climate coalition
formation, suggesting that they are indispensable for improving the robustness of
international agreements to control climate change (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998;
Barrett, 2003).
The interplay between innovation and climate policy is thus clearly relevant. A
natural question is then how to induce the technological change that will enhance
emission reductions, and to what degree policy should focus on stimulating carbon-
saving technological innovation. 
Unfortunately, energy-economy-climate models that are normally applied to
evaluate climate change mitigation policies seldom incorporate innovation
mechanisms such as R&D investments or diffusion of technology. Only a few
limited analyses are available of the R&D investment needs required to comply with
climate-stabilisation objectives (see, for example, Shock et al, 1999; Davis and
Owens, 2003; Nemet and Kammen, 2007; Bosetti et al, 2009a). Most of these are
outside the realm of general equilibrium models. For this reason, the interplay
between innovation and climate policy on both economic and environmental
grounds has seldom been assessed in a satisfactory manner.
This chapter summarises the authors’ recent work in the area of climate change
mitigation and technological change, as described in Bosetti et al (2008), Bosetti
et al (2009a), Bosetti et al (2009b) and OECD (2008). Most of the analysis
presented here has been performed with the energy-economy-climate model WITCH
(www.feem-web.it/witch), a tool developed within the Sustainable Development
programme at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
Technological innovation and R&D strategies for climate stabilisation
To be environmentally effective, a post-2012 climate policy will need to be
consistent with the long-term objective of stabilising carbon dioxide concentrations




likely to be difficult and costly, given the current CO2 concentration (about
380ppm, rising at 2-3 ppm per year), the persistence of CO2 in the atmosphere, and
the projected energy consumption and related emission trends. Emissions should
be curbed promptly and by a significant amount. For example, a scenario
compatible with the stabilisation of CO2 concentrations at 450ppm would require
mitigating world energy-related emissions by almost 40 percent before 2030, 70
percent before 2050, and 85 percent before 2100.
Emission reductions of this sort are challenging, given the expected growth rates of
world population and GDP, and the improvement in lifestyles that will, it is to be
hoped, take place in the many parts of the world where per-capita energy
consumption is currently low. The cumulative emission abatement needed from
today until 2100 to achieve the 450 ppm CO2 stabilisation target might exceed the
total amount of GHGs emitted into the atmosphere since the pre-industrial
revolution by almost three times. In per-capita terms, average world emissions in
the second part of this century would have to decline from about two to 0.3 tonnes
of carbon dioxide per capitaper year (which is today’s average in India).
Such a change will require a significant carbon price signal to decrease energy
consumption and increase the relative competitiveness of carbon-saving and
carbon-free technologies. Major investments in the energy sector would be needed
to make this happen. Currently known technologies can significantly contribute to
the mitigation challenge, mainly through renewables, carbon capture and storage
(CCS), nuclear and biomass, as well as improvements in energy efficiency and
demand-side management.
Nonetheless, the development of innovative technologies may prove to be
indispensable if we are to meet the increasingly stringent targets outlined above.
Yet, the competitiveness of technology is difficult to predict. In the case of energy
technologies like CCS or nuclear-power generation, additional factors such as public
acceptance, reliability and international security might put at risk their competitive














fragmented outcomes of public energy R&D programmes carried out in the 1980s.
Figure 5.1 shows the impact of technology availability on the economic cost of a
climate stabilisation scenario. In addition to the standard case, we evaluate the
implications of a scenario of limited technology development for power sector
technologies such as CCS, nuclear and renewables (Tech Constrained), as well as
one in which carbon-free innovative technologies become available within a few
decades, pending sufficient R&D investments (Tech Breakthrough)
21.
Figure 5.1: Global GDP losses resulting from a 450ppm CO2-only climate policy
under different technology scenarios, in 2030, 2050 and 2100
Source: Estimates from the energy-economy-climate model WITCH (www.feem-web.it/witch).
The results show that very significant reductions in the costs of meeting the
mitigation target could be achieved if intensified R&D policies resulted in the
development and deployment of new carbon-free technologies, especially in the
transport sector. Stabilisation costs in the standard scenario without constraints on
technological availability, but also without new carbon-free technologies, are about
three percent of global GDP in 2050, and eight percent in 2100. Figure 5.1
emphasises that, provided emission-pricing creates incentives to deploy them, theBEYOND COPENHAGEN
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availability of new carbon-free technologies could reduce to a great extent the
overall global costs of meeting the mitigation objectives, ie costs could be 1.8
percent of global GDP in 2050, and about one percent in 2100.
Initially, new carbon-free technologies would likely be economically uncompetitive.
However,  R&D investments and learning-by-doing processes might bring their
costs down to economically relevant levels over time, in the face of the steeply
rising costs of emitting GHGs. The relatively greater urgency for technological
breakthrough in the transport sector reflects the fact that renewables, nuclear
power and CCS provide substantial capacity for reducing GHG emissions from
electricity generation even if no breakthrough technology emerges in that sector in
the next few decades. If social or other concerns were to inhibit the full deployment
of nuclear and CCS options, a new solution for the power sector would become
equally urgent.
As also shown by Figure 5.1, constraints on the deployment of renewables, nuclear
power generation and CCS would raise the cost of achieving the mitigation
objectives substantially. Costs would be twice the level of the standard case, ie
about six percent of global GDP in 2050, and about 12 percent in 2100.
It should nevertheless be noted that benefits from climate mitigation would
materialise only in the long run, whereas the necessary R&D effort would actually
raise the medium-term costs. For instance, in 2030, in the technology-optimistic
scenario, climate policy costs would be 24 percent higher than in the standard-
technology scenario (from 1.3 percent to 1.6 percent), but this extra effort would be
more than offset by the benefits of the availability of an affordable and widely
deployable mitigation option in the second half of the century.
Developing new technologies will require a massive up-front public R&D effort in the
years to come, boosting carbon-saving R&D several fold. For example, public R&D
expenditures in the energy sector would need to increase considerably in response
to climate policy, as shown in Figure 5.2. This shows that sizeable public energyBEYOND COPENHAGEN
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R&D investments, in the order of US$40 billion per year and more, should
accompany a stringent cap-and-trade system. Note that a US$40 billion R&D
investment is one to two orders of magnitude smaller than the physical
investments that are needed to decarbonise the economy, eg in technologies such
as renewables, nuclear power generation and CCS. Thus, R&D stands out as a
relatively cheap hedging investment.
Figure 5.2: Optimal energy R&D investments in the 450 ppm CO2 (550 ppm CO2e)
climate policy scenario and in the baseline scenario, compared to historical figures
Source: Estimates from the energy-economy-climate model WITCH (www.feem-web.it/witch).
BAU = business as usual.
Furthermore, the optimum R&D investments would be comparable to those carried
out by the public sector alone in the 1980s, and might be well considered as a
minimum investment level if the world is actually committed to the unprecedented
international effort required by a climate-stabilisation policy. Something is already
moving in the policy arena, as proposals to raise considerably the energy R&D




A key policy question is to where such public R&D investments should be directed.
The figures indicate that R&D should be aimed at both energy decarbonisation and
energy conservation, but that in particular the former should be pursued. Most
innovation funding initially should be directed at emission sources other than
power generation. Particular attention should be paid to substituting the transport-
led oil demand. However, energy-efficiency innovation expenditure becomes more
relevant over time and eventually takes the lead. 
Can innovation be a stand-alone strategy or do we also need a carbon price?
In the previous section, the relevance of technological innovation for meeting
climate-stabilisation objectives was emphasised. The previous section also
suggested that technological innovation may not suffice to achieve the 450 ppm
CO2-stabilisation target if it is not coupled with a carbon-pricing policy. Indeed, the
R&D investments and related effects previously analysed were crucially linked to
the implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme. Nonetheless, technological
innovation and the deployment of carbon-free technologies have been shown to
have a major impact on the cost of climate policy. Therefore, one may wonder
whether a stand-alone innovation policy can achieve sufficient emission
reductions to stabilise GHG concentrations at about 450 ppm. The question
addressed in this section can be phrased as follows. Should climate policy focus
only on either innovation or emission policy (tax or cap-and-trade), or is it worth
pursuing a portfolio of different policies?
Let us consider first the environmental effectiveness of stand-alone innovation
policies. Our analysis indicates that innovation policies fall short of generating the
mitigation needed to stabilise carbon concentrations (see Figure 5.3 and OECD,
2008). At best, emissions (not concentrations) would be stabilised in the second
half of the century. In all cases, the atmospheric stock of CO2 would keep increasing
and so would global temperature, which remains rather close to the baseline case,

































































































550ppm CO2 eq./450ppm CO2 only scenario
Figure 5.3: Optimal CO2 concentration paths in the BAU scenario, in the case of a
stand-alone R&D policy, and in the case of a cap-and-trade stabilisation policy
Source: Estimates from the energy-economy-climate model WITCH (www.feem-web.it/witch).
BAU = business as usual.
The essential problem is that, even if innovative and effective technologies emerge,
they will not be intensively used until their costs come down close to those of
existing competing technologies (unless the new technologies are heavily
subsidised or the existing technologies heavily penalised). Carbon capture and
storage (CCS) technology provides an example of this challenge. This technology is
still new and costly. Intensive R&D efforts might well bring costs down steadily. But
this technology would not be widely used in power generation unless there were
significant incentives to cut carbon emissions, since otherwise it would reduce
generating efficiency and hence would raise costs without providing sufficient
returns. This shows that R&D efforts, however intensive, cannot by themselves
stabilise CO2 concentrations if incentives to deploy new technologies are weak.
Since stand-alone innovation policies seem unable to achieve sufficient climate
mitigation, we must ask to what extent these policies, when combined with carbon
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different policy mixes over the whole century. In all three scenarios, a cap-and-trade
scheme aimed at stabilising CO2 concentrations at 450 ppm is coupled with a
dedicated R&D programme. In the first scenario, resources are devoted to
enhancing energy efficiency. In the second scenario, resources are used to foster
the productivity of renewables and CCS. In the third scenario, the objective is to
accelerate the penetration of two new carbon-free technologies, one in the energy
sector and one in the transport sector.
Figure 5.4: Efficiency gains of hybrid policies over a climate-stabilisation policy
(percentage difference in gross world product losses to BAU)
Source: Estimates from the energy-economy-climate model WITCH (www.feem-web.it/witch).
BAU = business as usual.
In all three scenarios, initial efficiency losses are turned into benefits within one to
two decades. Substantial differences across the various innovation programmes
are nonetheless detectable. A programme dedicated to energy efficiency (E.E. R&D)
is the least effective, entailing initial losses below five percent and eventual stable
efficiency gains around two percent.
A policy aimed at fostering the productivity of renewables and CCS (wind+solar andCCS R&D) increases the policy cost by up to 15 percent initially, but this loss is
compensated for soon after 2020 by gains of the same order of magnitude. Over
time, however, the efficiency gains decline to only a few percentage points after mid
century, by which time the technologies are mature, ie their marginal costs are
dictated by deployment constraints such as site availability, and the relevance of
mitigation efforts in sectors other than power generation is more predominant.
By contrast, a policy focused on breakthrough innovation (Advanced Techs) allows
for continued efficiency gains for the entire century (again in the range of 10 to 15
percent), given that it is targeted at expanding the technology portfolio, in both the
power and transport sectors. However, the same policy requires a higher initial
incremental effort, whereas the benefits accrue more slowly over time, given that
the new advanced carbon-free technologies are initially very uncompetitive.
Figure 5.4 suggests a trade-off between timing and effectiveness of innovation
policies. Policies aimed at breakthrough innovation deliver the higher efficiency
gains because they reduce policy costs when they are higher, namely after 2030,
when the mitigation target becomes very stringent. Policies supporting existing
technologies such as wind or solar power and CCS provide earlier gains, but those
benefits cannot be sustained in the long run. In both cases, some losses are
involved in the initial periods. This lowers net-present-value gains, since losses
occur when they are weighted more. As a result, the net benefits of coupling carbon
pricing and innovation policies are bounded at roughly 10 percent.
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have argued that technological innovation and climate
stabilisation are closely intertwined. Innovation is a necessary but by far not the
only condition for achieving climate stabilisation at moderate economic cost. A
steadily rising, global and long-term carbon-price signal is the foremost tool needed
to tackle climate change. It is also likely to generate a sizeable increase in energy
R&D investment. Nonetheless, having complementary climate and innovation
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51policies might result in some efficiency gains, though they will probably not exceed
10-15 percent
23.
The real issue is indeed the deployment of carbon-cutting technologies.
Substitution effects seem to be more important than innovation effects, ie
technological innovation should be coupled with incentives to replace existing fossil
fuel-based and energy-intensive technologies with energy-efficient and carbon-free
ones. As shown, a limited deployment of currently known carbon-free technologies
would raise the cost of climate mitigation significantly. Costs would be even higher
if new carbon-saving technologies are not developed and deployed. Whereas
development crucially depends upon R&D investment, the size and timing of
deployment crucially depend upon the size and timing of the carbon-price signal.
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lobal climate change is the ultimate global-commons problem: because
greenhouse gases (GHGs) mix uniformly in the upper atmosphere, damage is
completely independent of the location of emissions sources. Thus, a multi-national
response is required. The greatest challenge lies in designing an international policy
architecture that can guide such efforts.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) marked the first meaningful attempt by the community of nations to curb
GHG emissions. This agreement, though a significant first step, is not sufficient for
the longer-term task ahead. Some observers support the policy approach embodied
in Kyoto and would like to see it extended – perhaps with modifications – beyond
the first commitment period, which ends in 2012. Others maintain that a
fundamentally new approach is required.
Whether one thinks the Kyoto Protocol was a good first step or a bad first step,
everyone agrees that a second step is required for the post-2012 period. The
Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements was launched with this
imperative in mind
24. The project is a global, multi-year, multi-disciplinary effort
intended to help identify the key design elements of a scientifically sound,
economically rational and politically pragmatic post-2012 international policy
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climate-policy regimearchitecture for addressing the threat of climate change. 
Principles for an international agreement
A set of core principles emerges from the diverse strands of research of the Harvard
Project. These principles constitute the fundamental premises that underlie various
proposed policy architectures and design elements; as such they can provide a
reasonable point of departure for ongoing international negotiations.
First, because climate change is a global-commons problem, cooperation among
countries is essential, whether through the UNFCCC; smaller, key coalitions such as
the Group of 20 nations (G20); or bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, since
sovereign nations cannot be compelled to act, treaties must create incentives both
for participation and compliance.
Second, a credible climate change agreement must be equitable. Industrialised
nations should accept responsibility for historic emissions, while emerging
economies need to take on increasingly meaningful roles over time. In both cases,
the scope of attention and action should include all GHGs, not only fossil carbon
dioxide (CO2).
Third, a credible agreement must be cost-effective, and therefore needs to bring
about technological change and transfer. In addition, it must be consistent with the
international trade regime. Fourth and finally, a credible agreement must be
practical and realistic. It should build on existing institutions and practices, where
possible, and negotiations should attend both to short-term achievements and
long-term goals. Finally, since no single approach guarantees a sure path to
ultimate success, it is best to pursue multiple approaches simultaneously.
Promising international climate-policy architectures
The decision to adopt a particular architecture is ultimately a political one, which
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54must be reached by the nations of the world, taking into account a complex array of
factors. In this chapter, we highlight just two potential architectures, each with
advantages as well as disadvantages. Each is promising in some regards, and also
raises key issues for consideration.
Formulas for evolving emission targets for all countries
This first option offers a centralised framework of formulas that yield numerical
emissions targets for all countries up to the end of this century (Frankel 2008).
National and regional cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases would be linked
in a way that would allow trading across firms and sources (Jaffe and Stavins
2008). Such a global trading system would be roughly analogous to the system
already established in the European Union, where sources rather than nations
engage in trading (Ellerman 2008).
The formulas are based on what is possible politically, given that many of the usual
science- and economics-based proposals for future emission paths are not
dynamically consistent – that is, future governments will not necessarily abide by
commitments made by today’s leaders. Several researchers have observed that
when participants in the policy process discuss climate targets, they typically pay
little attention to the difficulty of finding mutually acceptable ways to share the
economic burden of emission reductions (Bosetti et al, 2008, Jacoby et al, 2008).
This formula-based architecture is premised on four important political realities.
First, the US may not commit to quantitative emission targets if China and other
major developing countries do not commit to quantitative targets at the same time.
Second, China and other developing countries are unlikely to make sacrifices
different in character from those made by richer countries that have gone before
them. Third, in the long run, no country can be rewarded for having 'ramped up' its
emissions well above 1990 levels. Fourth, no country will agree to bear excessive
cost. Harstad (2008) adds that use of formulas can render negotiations more
effective.
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assigns quantitative emissions limits to countries in every year up to 2100. The
formula incorporates three elements: a progressivity factor, a latecomer catch-up
factor, and a gradual equalisation factor. The progressivity factor requires richer
countries to make more severe cuts relative to their business as usual emissions.
The latecomer catch-up factor requires nations that did not agree to binding targets
under the Kyoto Protocol, or that did not comply with their Kyoto targets, to make
gradual reductions to account for their additional emissions since 1990. This will
prevent latecomers from being rewarded with more generous targets, and will avoid
incentives for countries to ramp up their emissions before signing the agreement.
Finally, the gradual equalisation factor moves national per-capita emissions in the
direction of the global average of per-capita emissions in the second half of the
century
25.
The caps set for rich nations would require them to undertake immediate abatement
measures. Developing countries would not bear any cost in the early years, nor
would they be expected to make any sacrifice that is different from the sacrifices
made by industrialised countries, accounting for differences in income. Developing
countries would be subject to binding emission targets that would follow their
business as usual (BAU) emissions in the next several decades
26. National
emission targets for developed and developing countries alike would not cost more
than one percent of GDP in present-value terms, nor more than five percent of GDP
in any single year.
Every country under this proposal is given reason to feel that it is only doing its fair
share. The basic architecture of this proposal – a decade-by-decade sequence of
emission targets determined by a few principles and formulas – is flexible enough
that it can accommodate major changes in circumstances during the course of the
century.
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A new international policy architecture may be evolving on its own, based on the
reality that tradable permit systems, such as cap-and-trade systems, are emerging
worldwide as the favoured national and regional approach (Jaffe and Stavins
2008). Prominent examples include the EU’s emissions trading system (EU ETS);
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the northeastern US; and systems in
Norway, Switzerland and others; plus the existing global emission-reduction-credit
system, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Moreover, cap-and-trade
systems are emerging in Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the US.
The proliferation of cap-and-trade systems and emission-reduction-credit systems
around the world has generated increased attention and increased pressure – both
from governments and from the business community – to link these systems. By
linkage, we refer to direct or indirect connections between and among tradable
permit systems through the unilateral or bilateral recognition of allowances or
permits.
Linkage produces cost savings in the same way that a cap-and-trade system
reduces costs compared to a system that separately regulates individual emission
sources – that is, it substantially broadens the pool of lower-cost compliance
options available to regulated entities. In addition, linking tradable permit systems
at the country level reduces overall transaction costs, reduces market power, and
reduces overall price volatility.
There are also some legitimate concerns about linkage. Most important is the
automatic propagation of programme elements that are designed to contain costs,
such as banking, borrowing, and safety-valve mechanisms. If a cap-and-trade
system with a safety valve is directly linked to another system that does not have
a safety valve, the result will be that both systems now share the safety valve.
Given that the EU has opposed a safety valve in its emissions trading scheme, while
it appears possible that such a mechanism may be included in a future US
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containment design elements is important.
However, there are ways to gain the benefits of linkage without the downside of
having to harmonise systems in advance. If two cap-and-trade systems both link
with the same emission-reduction-credit system, such as the CDM, then the two
cap-and-trade systems are indirectly linked with one another. All of the benefits of
linkage occur: the cost-effectiveness of both cap-and-trade systems is improved
and both gain from more liquid markets that reduce transaction costs, market
power, and price volatility. At the same time, the automatic propagation of key
design elements from one cap-and-trade system to another is much weaker when
the systems are only indirectly linked through an emission-reduction-credit
system.
Such indirect linkage through the CDM is already occurring, because virtually all
cap-and-trade systems that are in place, as well those contemplated, allow for CDM
offsets to be used (at least to some degree) to meet domestic obligations. Thus,
indirectly linked, country- or region-based cap-and-trade systems may already be
evolving into the de-facto, if not the de-jure, post-Kyoto international climate-policy
architecture.
A post-2012 international climate agreement could include several elements that
would facilitate future linkages among cap-and-trade and emission-reduction-
credit systems (Jaffe and Stavins 2008). For example, it could establish an agreed
trajectory of emissions caps (Frankel 2008) or allowance prices, specify
harmonised cost-containment measures, and establish a process for making future
adjustments to key design elements. It could also create an international clearing
house for transaction records and allowance auctions, provide for the ongoing
operation of the CDM, and build capacity in developing countries. If the aim is to
facilitate linkage, a future agreement should also avoid imposing 'supplementarity'




Great challenges confront the community of nations seeking to establish an
effective and meaningful international climate regime for the post-2012 period. But
some key principles and promising policy architectures have begun to emerge.
Climate change is a global-commons problem, and therefore a cooperative approach
involving many nations will be necessary to address it successfully. Since
sovereign nations cannot be compelled to act against their wishes, successful
treaties must create adequate internal incentives for compliance, along with
external incentives for participation. A credible global climate change agreement
must be: equitable; cost-effective; able to facilitate significant technological change
and technology transfer; consistent with the international trade regime; practical, in
the sense that it builds – where possible – on existing institutions and practices;
attentive to short-term achievements, as well as medium-term consequences and
long-term goals; and realistic. Because no single approach guarantees a sure path
to ultimate success, the best strategy may be to pursue a variety of approaches
simultaneously.
The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements does not endorse a single
international climate-policy architecture. In this chapter, we have highlighted two
potential frameworks among many for a post-Kyoto agreement. Each is promising
in some regards and raises important issues for consideration. One calls for
emissions caps established using a set of formulas that assign quantitative
emissions limits to countries up to 2100. These caps would be implemented
through a global system of linked national and regional cap-and-trade programmes
that would allow for trading among firms and sources. Second, we discussed an
architecture that – at least in the short term – links national and regional tradable-
permit systems only indirectly, through the global CDM. We highlight this option
less as a recommendation and more by way of recognising the structure that may
already be evolving as part of the de-facto post-Kyoto international climate policy
architecture.
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591 This chapter discusses some of the issues raised at several events held at Bruegel
during 2008 and 2009 on the shaping of a global climate agreement. The note does not
however represent the views of participants. Special thanks to Stephen Gardner for
fruitful discussion and help in preparing this chapter.
2 Put in place after the United Nations COP13 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, December 2007.
See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_act_p.pdf
3 REACH (registration, evaluation and authorisation of chemicals) requires all chemicals
manufactured in or imported into the EU to be screened for impacts on health and the
environment. REACH is administed by the European Chemicals Agency. See:
http://echa.europa.eu/
4 The EU strategic energy technologies action plan (SET-Plan) is a strategic initiative
designed to accelerate the development and deployment of cost-effective low carbon
technologies. The plan includes measures relating to planning, implementation,
resources and international cooperation in the field of energy technology. It was
published in 2007 (‘A European strategic energy technology plan (SET Plan) – towards
a low carbon future’, COM (2007) 723).
5 Acemoglu et al(2009) show how endogenous innovation and directed technical change
can make compatible sustained growth and the need to avoid climate change. Acemoglu
et al(2008) argue that by taxing ‘dirty’ technologies, one directs innovation investment
towards clean technologies, with no necessary effect on the overall rate of innovation.
In the long-run, such tax might raise growth since it would eliminate the negative impact
on growth of catastrophic events associated to the dirty technology. The tax would
obviously not be costless and would reduce current output. The tax does not need to be
permanent: temporary taxation could be sufficient to induce the use of green
technologies, changing the growth path but not affecting the growth rate.
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6 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2007) was published in
October 2006 by the British government.
7 ‘...rising to 30 percent if there is an international agreement committing other developed
countries to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced
developing countries to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and
respective capabilities’ (European Commission, 2008).
8 ‘Member States would also have access to CDM credits covering almost one third of their
reduction effort’ (ibid).
9 The EU has called for China and other emerging economies to reduce emissions by up to
30 percent compared to business as usual. See European Commission (2009).
10 On the choice of instruments, see Hepburn, in Helm and Hepburn (2009).
11 Stern (2007), but see also Helm (2008a).
12 In technical terms, this is a partial Roberts and Spence hybrid scheme (Roberts and
Spence, 1976).
13 For a proposed way forward, see Helm (2008b).
14 It is already apparent that there are considerable political pressures to weaken the EU
Large Combustion Plant Directive (2001/80/EC) so that the life of existing coal power
stations can be extended. The UK has now announced a significant expansion of coal,
most of which will be unabated for a decade. See Miliband (2009).
15 China and India have populations of around 1.3 billion and 1.15 billion people
respectively, and these populations are expected to grow significantly by 2050. Adding
in a further billion for Africa gives more extra people by 2050 than the entire world
population in 1950. See IEA, 2008, table 5.1, p. 125.
16 The European Commission published on 19 May 2009 a call for proposals for CCS and
offshore wind projects, to be financed from an EU economic stimulus budget, see
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:114:0010:
0010:EN:PDF
17 The EU ETS was established as the main mechanism to ensure that the EU as a whole
keeps to its Kyoto Protocol commitments.
18 Neither Cyprus nor Malta are Annex I signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. 
19 The Fourteenth Conference of the Parties (COP14) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), December 2008.
20 This chapter is part of the research work being carried out by the Sustainable
Development Programme of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.  The authors are grateful
to the OECD for financial support.
21 The two scenarios are detailed in OECD (2008). In the first, the deployment of CCS andnuclear energy is limited by political considerations, availability of sites, and
environmental concerns. In the second, costly R&D investments and learning-by-doing
reduce the cost of new carbon-free technologies, which therefore penetrate the market
by mid-century.
22 US President Obama recently committed to R&D tax exemptions and an additional
investment of US$ 1.2 billion in basic energy-related research, see
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10202041-54.html.
23 Given the high stakes at play, such benefits might still be significant, and exceed US$ 1
trillion. 
24 This chapter draws upon the Interim Report of the Harvard Project on International
Climate Agreements (Aldy and Stavins, 2008), and as such we are indebted to the
project's 26 research teams, whose work is documented in our book (Aldy and Stavins,
2009). The project grew from our earlier book, Architectures for Agreement: Addressing
Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World (Aldy and Stavins, 2007).The Doris Duke
Charitable Foundation has provided major funding for the project, with additional support
from Christopher Kaneb, the James and Cathleen Stone Foundation, Paul Josefowitz and
Nicholas Josefowitz, the Enel Endowment for Environmental Economics at Harvard
University, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy
School, and the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard
Kennedy School.
25 This is similar to Cao’s (2008) 'global development rights' (GDR) burden-sharing formula
and is consistent with calls for movement toward per capita responsibility by Agarwala
(2008). On the other hand, it contrasts with the analyses of Jacoby et al (2008) and
Posner and Sunstein (2008).
26 Somanathan (2008) argues against including developing countries in the short term,
even with targets equivalent to business as usual.
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The following definitions are mostly derived from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change website's glossary of climate change acronyms
(available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php).
Annex I Parties: Industrialised countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC committed
to return their greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. They
have also accepted emissions targets for the period 2008-12 as per the Kyoto
Protocol. They include the 24 original OECD members, the European Union, and 14
countries with economies in transition. In addition, Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco,
and Slovenia later joined Annex I, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia replaced
Czechoslovakia.
Assigned amount unit (AAU):A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to one metric tonne of CO2
equivalent.  Each Annex I Party issues AAUs up to the level of its assigned amount,
established pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol. Assigned amount units may be
exchanged through emissions trading.
Certified emission reduction (CER):A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to one metric tonne
of CO2 equivalent. CERs are issued for emission reductions from CDM project
activities. Two special types of CERs called temporary certified emission reduction
(tCERs) and long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs) are issued for
emission removals from afforestation and reforestation CDM projects.BEYOND COPENHAGEN
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Carbon capture and storage (CCS): Alternatively, carbon sequestration – the
process of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and depositing it in a
reservoir.
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol
through which developed countries may finance greenhouse-gas emission
reduction or removal projects in developing countries, and receive credits for doing
so, which they may apply towards meeting mandatory limits on their own
emissions.
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of the UNFCCC. It currently
meets once a year to review the Convention's progress. The word ‘conference’ is not
used here in the sense of ‘meeting’ but rather of ‘association’. The Fifteenth COP will
take place in Copenhagen, Denmark, on 7-18 December, 2009.
Emission reduction unit (ERU): A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to one metric tonne of
CO2 equivalent.  ERUs are generated for emission reductions or emission removals
from joint implementation project.
Emissions trading: One of the three Kyoto mechanisms, by which an Annex I party
may transfer Kyoto Protocol units to or acquire units from another Annex I party. An
Annex I party must meet specific eligibility requirements to participate in emissions
trading.
European Union allowance (EUA):The traded unit in the EU ETS.
European Union emissions trading scheme (ETS): An emissions trading, or cap-
and-trade, scheme launched in the EU in 2005, to help the EU meet its Kyoto
Protocol commitments.
Greenhouse gases (GHGs): The atmospheric gases responsible for causing global
warming and climate change. The major GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N20). Less prevalent – but very powerful – greenhouse
gases are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6).
Joint implementation (JI): A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol through which adeveloped country can receive ERUs when it helps to finance projects that reduce
net greenhouse-gas emissions in another developed country (in practice, the
recipient state is likely to be a country with an economy in transition). An Annex I
Party must meet specific eligibility requirements to participate in joint
implementation.
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement linked to the UNFCCC; it sets binding
targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European Community for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): The overall
framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate
change. It recognises that the climate system is a shared resource whose stability
can be affected by industrial and other emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases. The Convention enjoys near universal membership, having been
ratified by 192 countries. The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994.
Verified emissions reduction (VER): The traded unit in voluntary carbon markets.
See chapter 3 of this volume.
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